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Objective: The objective of the article is to determine the effect of governance structure 
components (audit committee presence, board size adequacy, and board leadership) on 
SMEs’ performance and the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) tenure on 
the influence of governance structure on SMEs’ performance in Ghanaian context. 
Research Design & Methods: We sampled 145 respondents from selected SMEs in the 
Ghanaian manufacturing, telecommunication, and financial sectors for the study. All 
selected participants completed questionnaires on governance structure and shared 
their informed perception of the enterprises’ performance. The data gathered were 
analysed using multiple regression analysis and Hayes’ process macro. 
Findings: The results indicated that board leadership, the presence of an audit commit-
tee, and board size adequacy do not significantly influence SMEs’ performance. The 
results further revealed that CEO tenure is a significant negative moderator to the in-
fluence of the governance structure on SMEs’ performance. 
Implications & Recommendations: Future studies must focus on how SMEs in Ghana 
can put CEOs and board succession plans in place so as to ensure creativity/innovation. 
Contribution & Value Added: This study contributes to the body of knowledge relating 
to the governance structure’s influence on various indicators of business performance 
of SMEs in Ghana. Therefore, this study sought to assess the contribution of corporate 
governance structures to the performance of SMEs in Ghana. This would help SMEs to 
know which aspects of their governance structure should be strengthened to effec-
tively contribute to their success. 
Article type: research article 
Keywords: 
governance structure; board size adequacy; board leadership; audit 
committee; enterprise performance 
JEL codes:  G34, L25 
Received: 27 January 2020 Revised: 23 June 2020 Accepted: 8 July 2020 
 
Suggested citation:  
Okofo-Darteh, D. & Asamoah, E.S. (2020). Does the presence of governance structure affect small 
and medium-sized enterprise performance? Evidence from an emerging market. Entrepreneurial 
Business and Economics Review, 8(3), 117-133. https://doi.org/10.15678/EBER.2020.080307 




Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are considered critical to economic growth 
and equitable development in developing economies (Agwu & Emeti, 2014). They are usu-
ally regarded as efficient, creative, and fruitful job creators, the seeds of future big industry 
giants, and the fuel of national economy (Abor & Quartey, 2010). As important as SMEs 
are to various economies, it is important to ensure their effective management and good 
corporate governance. The major aim is long-term shareholder value, while taking into 
account the interests of other stakeholders (Abor & Adjasi, 2007). Abor and Adjasi (2007) 
opined that – since corporate governance regulates the internal affairs of large scale com-
panies – it may also improve SME performance, if regulators make it a mandatory require-
ment. Moreover, the majority of SMEs in Ghana find themselves in the owner/chief exec-
utive officer (CEO)/manager situation, in which they take it upon themselves to shoulder 
all major decisions (Abor & Adjasi, 2007). 
This appears to be a problem for the SME sector in Ghana because most of such en-
trepreneurs usually possess limited formal education, access to cutting-edge technologies, 
and market information; thus, scholars believe these entrepreneurs to be characterised 
by the lack or inadequate presence of proper governance systems (Abor & Biekpe, 2007). 
Most efforts to help remedy this phenomenon by researchers appear to be mainly limited 
to studies on SMEs in developed economies (Bennett & Robson, 2004) to the near neglect 
of emerging markets in Africa and specifically Ghana.  
The focus of corporate governance studies in emerging markets has largely ignored 
SMEs. The few existing studies on SMEs’ governance in Ghana justifiably employ objective 
measures. However, the present study appears to be one of the very few studies – if not 
the sole study – to use subjective measures. The novelty of our study lies in the fact that 
it departs from usual corporate governance studies on large corporations to bring to light 
what pertains in the SME circles in Ghana by using subjective measures and determining 
the moderating influence of CEO tenure on the governance structure-enterprise perfor-
mance link. While it is imperative to examine corporate governance in the SME sector in 
the context of an emerging economy such as Ghana, the question of whether the presence 
of governance structures in SMEs contributes to their performance appears to have no 
recent empirical elaboration with subjective measures.  
Therefore, the objectives of our study are to discover the effect of governance structure 
components on the performance of SMEs in Accra and to determine the moderation effect 
of CEO tenure on the relationship between governance structure and enterprise perfor-
mance in SMEs. The literature review presents empirical studies on the relationship between 
components of governance structure of this study’s interest – board size adequacy, the pres-
ence of an audit committee, board leadership, and CEO tenure – and performance.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Ghanaian Business Context 
The business sector of Ghana is thriving and characterised by small, medium-sized, and large 
enterprises. The main sectors include: agriculture which contributes 18.3% of GDP, and em-
ploys about 34% of the country’s workforce; manufacturing accounts for about 31.5% of 
Does the presence of governance structure affect small and medium-sized… | 119
 
GDP, which is dominated by mining, lumbering, light manufacturing, aluminium smelting, 
food processing, cement production, small commercial ship building, and petroleum; 
whereas the largest component of the economy is the service sector that comprises about 
43% of GDP, employing about 48% of the working population (NORDEA, 2020). Altogether, 
SMEs in the country contribute 85% of employment in the manufacturing sector, represent 
about 70% of GDP and account for about 85% of general business in the country. Policymak-
ers, development practitioners, and community leaders continue to develop policies and 
strategies to improve the sector (Okofo-Darteh, Amartei-Kwei, & Boahen, 2020). 
What Is an SME in Ghana? 
An SME is usually defined using the number of employees of the enterprise or the value 
of the enterprise’s fixed assets (Abor & Quartey, 2010). The Ghana Statistical Services 
(GSS), the Ghana Enterprise Development Commission (GEDC), and the National Board for 
Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) consider either the number of employees or value of fixed 
assets or both as criteria for their unique categorisation of enterprises, respectively.  
However, the current study favours the definition by the Regional Project on Enterprise 
Development Ghana, which classifies enterprises into: (i) micro enterprise, with less than 
five employees; (ii) small enterprise, with five to 29 employees; (iii) medium enterprise, with 
30-99 employees; (iv) large enterprise, with a 100 and more employees. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this study, SMEs are enterprises that employ from five to 99 employees in Ghana. 
While most SMEs in Ghana are family-controlled businesses, others are listed on the stock 
exchange and tend to have limited control of the business by a family. The focus of this study 
is generally on small and medium-sized enterprises in Ghana: listed and unlisted. 
Corporate Governance 
The OECD (2004) defines corporate governance as a set of relationships between a com-
pany’s board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Cadbury (1992) also defines cor-
porate governance as a whole system of controls, both financial and other, with which a 
company is directed and controlled. Both definitions reveal the fact that corporate gov-
ernance represents the conscience of an enterprise in all its dealings. Therefore, the study 
considers both definitions. Other theories also help build on the concept by propounding 
theories that explain the corporate governance issue, namely the agency theory, the stew-
ardship theory, the resources dependence theory, and the stakeholder theory.  
The agency theory necessitates a contract under which business owners (principal) em-
ploy someone as a CEO and others as board members (agents) to run the business in the 
interest of the owners. Instead, the stewardship theory opines that the main aspiration of 
management is to maximise the enterprise’s performance by being a good custodian of cor-
porate assets (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The resource dependence theory by Pfeffer (1973) 
and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) emphasises that board directors should be non-executives 
who have valuable social capital and connections to enhance the enterprise’s ability to ac-
quire resources from various sources. According to this theory, board directors usually be-
come the conduit for resource acquisition mainly through their social and professional net-
works (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). The stakeholder theory expresses the need for enter-
prises to consider the interests of various other stakeholder groups – including employees, 
customers, suppliers, the local community – in addition to interests of investors (Freeman, 
1984; Gibson, 2000). This will result in the enterprise’s ability to build consensus among all 
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critical stakeholders. What applies better in the case of family-owned SMEs employing non-
family members to the board are the stewardship and stakeholder theories.  
Corporate Governance through the Prism of New Institutional Economics 
New institutional economics (NIE) focuses on coordination processes that lead to particular 
decisions about resource allocation rather than on results of resource allocation. Klepczarek 
(2017) believes that the new institutional economics concept relies on institutions, govern-
ance structures, and individuals’ interaction in the organization, which determines the per-
formance of the organization and the economy. Researchers currently agree with Sonmez 
and Yildirim (2015) that corporate governance is usually concerned with issues of sharehold-
ers’ value maximization (the agency theory) and the role of stakeholders in the management 
system of enterprises (the stakeholder theory). They also believe that agency and stake-
holder theory along with all other institution-related corporate governance theories are par-
tial paradigms or perspectives that always go together just as the NIE perspective suggests; 
even in the case of SMEs in Ghana that practice corporate governance. 
Why Ghanaian SMEs May Find Corporate Governance Important? 
SMEs in Ghana are increasingly embracing the concept of good corporate governance as it 
leads to sustainable business growth (Kyereboah-Coleman & Amidu, 2008). There have also 
been several calls from professional institutions concerning the need for SMEs to have a 
good governance framework in place. First is the continual advice by Ghana’s Trade and In-
dustry Ministry to SMEs to adopt governing boards and proper management systems to pro-
vide enterprises with strategic direction for their operation. Second, Ghana’s Companies Act 
of 2019 (Act 992) stipulates that all companies registered under the law, regardless of their 
size or public interest level, must be audited by certified auditors and must file audited fi-
nancial statements with the Registrar General. The Act also stipulates the need to appoint 
directors, and it defines the role of board chairs. Now, since most SMEs register as compa-
nies, they are enjoined by law to comply. Therefore, proper compliance with law implies the 
need for good corporate governance practices, and governing boards to oversee the compli-
ance internally. Moreover, the introduction of the SME capital market – the Ghana Alterna-
tive Exchange (GAX), which is a category of listing on the exchange to SMEs – has also implic-
itly influenced most SMEs in Ghana to establish governing boards to be able to list on the 
exchange when thinking of scaling-up their businesses. Finally, while the SMEs in Ghana may 
not really want to institute a board, they may still find it necessary out of sheer mimicry, 
since they want to appear like the larger more successful companies that profess to have a 
board and tout their operations to be guided by board decisions. 
Components of Governance Structure 
The following provides an analysis of the empirical literature on the components of gov-
ernance structures within enterprises.  
Board Size Adequacy 
There are two distinct schools of thought on the adequacy of size of the boards. The first 
believes that a smaller board size – while competent and closely-knit – would contribute 
to the success of an enterprise (Mayur & Saravanan, 2017) more than a large board size 
(Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008). Other studies indicate that a large board will support and 
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advise enterprise management more effectively in a complex business environment (Ber-
trand, Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2019). Kumar and Singh (2013) opine that a large 
board size will gather much more information for enterprise performance. Empirical stud-
ies in Ghana expose inconclusive relationships between the adequacy of board size and 
performance. A study by Ansong (2015) in Ghana reveals that there is a significant positive 
relationship between board size adequacy and enterprise performance. This is corrobo-
rated by Abor and Biekpe (2007) who find that there is positive association between board 
size and performance. Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu (2008) find instead a negative cor-
relation between board size and performance. Their argument is that large boards are less 
effective and easier for the CEO to control as opposed to smaller boards whose size re-
duces the possibility of free-riding by individual directors, which increases the effective-
ness of smaller boards’ decision-making processes. However, a study by Topak (2011) re-
veals that that board size adequacy does not have a significant influence on enterprise 
performance. The current study hypothesises that: 
H1: Board size adequacy will have a significant positive influence on enterprise per-
formance. 
Audit Committee 
Accounting irregularities are rife in corporate organizations, which results in compliance 
issues; therefore, audit committees should be established in organizations (Kyereboah-
Coleman, 2007). This helps to make such committees independent. Thus, Kyereboah-Cole-
man (2007) advance that a wholly independent audit committee should consist solely of 
Non-Executive Directors and non-affiliates of the company, such as the enterprise’s previ-
ous directors. Omer, Shelley, and Tice (2019) reveal that earning reports improve once 
audit committees are established, since its establishment engenders transparency and 
compliance. It is expected that the work of audit committees helps to achieve enterprise 
performance (Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014). A study by Kyereboah-Coleman and 
Amidu (2008) in Ghana reveals that the presence of audit committees to oversee day-to-
day financial commitments of enterprises and make prudent use of funds enhances per-
formance. Dzigba (2015) reveals that, among SMEs in Ghana, audit committees were the 
most relevant among all other subcommittees to financial performance and access to 
credit. Ojeka, Iyoha, and Obigbemi (2014) in Nigeria also report a significant positive rela-
tionship between an audit committee and financial performance, because of the former’s 
financial expertise. Apparently, SMEs with audit committees are successful according to 
previous empirical studies. The current study hypothesises that: 
H2: The presence of audit committees will have a significant positive influence on 
enterprise performance. 
Board Leadership Structure 
CEO and chairperson positions may be held by the same person, which may likely pose 
serious problems (Emile, Ragab, & Kyaw, 2014). According to Ponnu (2008), some enter-
prises employ a combined leadership structure, in which the CEO doubles as board chair, 
while other employ a separated structure, which clearly distinguishes the positions of 
CEO from board chairmanship. Most researchers favour the separated structure because 
it ensures the balance of power of both positions in addition to avoiding a conflict of 
122 | Daniel Okofo-Darteh, Emmanuel Selase Asamoah
 
interest. Ponnu (2008) and Emile et al. (2014) further assert that it is also to promote fair 
judgment. Many studies identify the implications of CEO duality. Enterprises involved in 
earnings manipulations usually have a CEO doubling as the board chair (Ponnu, 2008). To 
this, Ponnu (2008) furthers that in all types of enterprises, when the combined leadership 
structure is employed, such a situation leads to the board being compromised so that its 
opinions and recommendations are dogmatically the same as that of the CEO, despite 
the presence of independent directors. 
Abor and Biekpe (2007) report that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and enterprise performance. This suggests that in SMEs where an individual com-
bines both CEO and board chairman roles (one-tier board leadership structure), enter-
prise performance is better than those with two individuals performing such roles (two-
tier board leadership structure). Conversely, Sanda, Mukaila, and Garba (2003) find in 
the Nigerian context a positive relationship between enterprise performance and the 
board leadership structure where the functions of the CEO and Chairman are separated. 
Instead, Rashid (2009) shows on the example of Bangladesh that board leadership struc-
ture does not influence enterprise performance. Clearly, there is inconclusive empirical 
evidence of the influence of board leadership structure on enterprise performance. Nev-
ertheless, the current study hypothesises that: 
H3: Board leadership structure will have a significant positive influence on enter-
prise performance. 
Enterprise Performance 
One of the most appropriate objective measures for enterprise performance for this study 
is Tobin’s Q, which is probably the most frequently used valuation measure in empirical cor-
porate finance. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value to the replacement value of an enter-
prise’s assets. As an approximation for measurement, the market value of assets is normally 
computed as market value of equity plus book value of assets, minus book value of equity 
(Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2008). The result is then divided by the book value of assets 
to obtain the Tobin’s Q, which indicates that management has done well in its investment 
decisions. However, the researchers were constrained, since the enterprises were protective 
of the necessary information needed to calculate the Tobin’s Q. However, subjective perfor-
mance measures have proven to also be reliable for measuring enterprise performance 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1987). Subjective performance measures increase the re-
sponse rate in which objective data are neither available nor are there respondents willing 
or able to reveal the information. Enterprise performance in this study is defined as the com-
posite index of perceptions of profitability, sales, market share, and productivity. 
Moderating Variables 
Moderators are variables that seek to affect the relationship between dependent and in-
dependent variables. The present study tests CEO tenure as a moderator. 
CEO Tenure 
CEO tenure in this study is expressed as the number of years a CEO has held the position. 
Rashid, Islam, and Anderson (2008) state that moderating variables play an important role 
in the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Merika, Triantafyllou, 
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Kalogeropoulou, and Kalokairinos (2016), Galoji, Ahmed, and Johari, (2013), Allgood and 
Farrell (2000) and Luo, Kanuri, and Andrews (2013) find that CEO tenure positively influ-
ences performance, and the longer a CEO serves, the more enterprise performance im-
proves. This is because it affords the CEO’s the opportunity to witness the results of their 
decisions (Kyereboah & Coleman, 2007).  
Nonetheless, we should note that CEO tenure may also negatively affect enterprise 
performance. The leader life cycle theory proposed by Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) as-
serts that performance slumps as CEO interest in tasks gradually decrease, usually after six 
years (Giambatista, 2004). Therefore, in our study we tested CEO tenure as a moderating 
variable in the SME context. It advances the argument that CEO tenure constitutes another 
important governance mechanism (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). The present study aims to 
determine the effect of governance structures’ components on the performance of SMEs 
and the moderating effect of CEO tenure on governance structures and SMEs perfor-
mance. Thus, we formulated following hypothesis: 
H4: CEO tenure will have a significant positive moderation influence on the rela-
tionship between governance structure and enterprise performance. 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Population and sample 
The population of interest for this study included all SMEs in Ghana. Information from the 
Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) suggests an estimated registered population of 
about 1500 SMEs nationwide. The estimated population of registered SMEs in Accra was 
about 800 registered SMEs. Purposive-snowball sampling technique was employed. Pur-
posive sampling technique was employed for choosing enterprises, because the study fo-
cused on SMEs that made efforts to establish a governance board and relevant commit-
tees. These should have been in operation for at least five consecutive years, so that their 
CEOs would have completed the “honeymoon period” defined as the first three years of 
office (Limbach, Schmid, & Scholz, 2015). Such enterprises would have a great deal of ex-
perience with sustained governance structures. For the respondents of the study, we em-
ployed the snowball sampling technique.  
The sampling frame for the study comprised senior-level employees who interact 
with the governance structure of enterprises or companies. The sample size was deter-
mined using the sample size formula by Tabachnik and Fidell (2007), which stipulates 
that for an appropriate sample size in studies that employ multiple regression, the min-
imum sample size (N) should be (N>50+8M) in which M is the total number of independ-
ent variables. As there are three independent variables in the study, the minimum sam-
ple size required for this study was 74; i.e. 50 + 8(3) = 74. Therefore, the sample size of 
145 respondents each representing 145 enterprises more than satisfies the acceptable 
sample size for the present study. 
Instrumentation 
The study employs the following measuring instruments: 
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Governance Self-Assessment Test 
This instrument was originally developed by Gill, Flynn, and Reissing (2005) and covers 
some governance structure essentials that boards ought to display for effective govern-
ance. Therefore, the instrument was used to measure perceptions of variables such as the 
presence of audit committee, board size adequacy, and board leadership. Responses to 
these statements were measured on a five-point Likert scale. Hence, the respective varia-
bles were computed as the mean of aggregate responses to question items relating to 
each governance structure component. Governance structure was also operationalised as 
a mean scores index of computed governance structure components. 
Enterprise Performance Survey 
In a single statement, the researchers subjectively measured enterprise performance with 
respect to profitability, sales, market share, and productivity. Responses to these state-
ments were measured on a five-point Likert scale. Therefore, enterprise performance was 
computed as a mean of the aggregate of responses on the enterprise performance survey. 
Therefore, enterprise performance in this study is defined as the composite index of per-
ceptions of profitability, sales, market share, and productivity. 
Reliability and Validity 
The reliability of the Governance Self-Assessment Test was tested using a test-retest 
procedure. The researchers repeated measurements of the same respondent by using 
the same questionnaire within an interval of seven days. The researchers repeated the 
measurement of the same tool using the same questionnaire under similar conditions. 
Using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21, the reliability of the 
tools was calculated to ensure a Cronbach’s alpha (α) at or above 0.6, which is the ac-
ceptable value. If the results are similar then the questionnaire has high reliability. The 
value of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was expected to be 1.0, which indicates the high 
reliability of the instrument. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) state that, a Cronbach’s al-
pha value equal to or greater than 0.70 is considered satisfactory. Reliability estimates 
between 0.60 and 0.70 are acceptable; whereas a Cronbach’s alpha below 0.60 is usually 
regarded as unacceptably low. The final reliability tests obtained were Governance 
Structure, α = 0.853, and enterprise performance, α= 0.870. 
The Assumption of Normality Test 
A normality test was conducted for all variables, and it satisfied the requirement that 
data collected must be normally distributed. The inferential statistic information ob-
tained is that the p values for variables ranged from 0.081 to 0.296, according to the 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test. The normality test showed that all values were significant 
as the data met the threshold of 0.05. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The following section presents the results of data analysis and findings. The analyses are 
presented per each research objective. 




Table 1 also shows the demographic distribution of the SMEs. 
Table 1. Enterprises’ Demographic Description 
Variables Items Frequency Percentage (%) 
Enterprise Age 
5 years 18 12.4 
6 years 30 20.7 
7 years 29 20.0 
8 years and more 68 46.9 
Enterprise size 
5-29 employees 98 67.6 
30-99 employees 47 32.4 
CEO Duality 
Yes 93 64.1 
No 52 35.9 
CEO Tenure 
3 years 22 15.2 
4 years 45 31.0 
5 years and more 78 53.8 
Source: own elaboration of research results (n=145). 
Out of the 145 SMEs, 18 (12.4% of all studied SMEs) operated for at least five years, 
30 (20.7%) were in business for six years, 29 (20%) for seven years, and 68 (46.9%) for 
eight years and more. Ninety-eight (98) enterprises (67.6%) were small-sized businesses 
ranging from five to 29 employees, while 47 enterprises (32.4%) were medium-sized busi-
nesses with 30 to 99 employees. The majority of CEOs (78; 53.8% of all studied CEOs) con-
trolled their enterprises for five years and more, followed by 45 (31%) CEOs who held the 
position for four years. Twenty-two (22) CEOs (15.2%) held their posts for three years. The 
question of CEO duality required a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer. A ‘Yes' answer is interpreted to 
mean that the CEO (owner) is also the board chair. The ‘No’ answer means the opposite. 
Therefore, 93 CEOs (64.1 % of all studied CEOs) acted as board chairs, whereas 52 CEOs 
did not double as board chairs, which meant that different individuals lead their boards. 
First Research Objective 
The first research objective sought to determine the effect of governance structure com-
ponents – board size adequacy, the presence of an audit committee, board leadership – 
on enterprise performance. Table 2 provides the coefficient matrix of governance struc-
ture and performance of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
The study found that board size adequacy did not significantly contribute to enterprise 
performance (β = -0.063, p = 0.460). Hence, we reject the hypothesis H1 “Board size ade-
quacy will have a significant positive influence on enterprise performance,” and we accept 
the null hypothesis. This is contrary to findings by Ansong (2015) and Abor and Biekpe 
(2007) who revealed that the relationship of board size to enterprise performance is di-
rect, statistically significant, and positive. The finding of Kyereboah-Coleman and Amidu 
(2008) that there is a negative relationship was also not confirmed. However, Topak (2011) 
corroborates the findings of the present study, as he found that board size does not have 
a significant influence on enterprise performance. This means that the size of the board 
126 | Daniel Okofo-Darteh, Emmanuel Selase Asamoah
 
does not play any important role in the performance of enterprises. This is quite close to 
saying that boards in Ghanaian SMEs are probably just for show.  









Model B se Beta t p Tolerance VIF 
1(Constant) 14.150 2.227 x 6.353 0.000 x x 
BSizeAd -0.063 0.084 -0.063 -0.740 0.460 0.985 1.015 
Audit  0.003 0.101 0.002 0.027 0.979 0.866 1.154 
BLead 0.023 0.088 0.023 0.257 0.789 0.878 1.139 
Note: dependent variable is enterprise performance. 
B – unstandardised beta, se – standard error, t – t-test value, p – significance value, VIF – Variance Inflation Factor. 
Source: own elaboration based on research results (n=145). 
Our study also found that audit committees do not contribute significantly to enter-
prise performance (β = 0.003, p = 0.979). Hence, we reject the hypothesis H2 “The presence 
of audit committees will have a significant positive influence on enterprise performance” 
and accept the null hypothesis. These committees are established to ensure compliance 
with requirements of regulatory bodies, ensure internal auditing and help to minimise un-
necessary expenditure within organisations. In line with the agency theory, an audit com-
mittee functions as an additional control mechanism that ensures that shareholders’ in-
terests are secured (Ahmed & Gabor, 2012). The frequency of audit committee meetings 
is supposed to enable them to perform their functions effectively by concurrently safe-
guarding the interest of shareholders. The non-influence of committees on performance 
may result from inadequate and ineffective meetings. Another reason for that may stem 
from CEOs’ dual roles, hence domination of their whims over the committees. 
Furthermore, board leadership (β = 0. 023, p = 0.789) failing to influence enterprise per-
formance necessitated our rejection of the hypothesis H3 “Board leadership structure will 
have a significant positive influence on enterprise performance” and accept the null hypoth-
esis. The board leadership literature reveals mixed findings in regard to the extent of CEOs’ 
effectiveness doubling as board chairmen; whereas some observe positive influence (Harjoto 
& Hoje, 2008), others notice negative influence (see Schmid & Zimmermann, 2005) or show 
indifferent findings (Elsayed, 2007; Rahman & Haniffa, 2005). According to Lokuwaduge 
(2011), agency theory and stewardship theory address the board leadership structure. 
Second Research Objective 
The second research objective focused on determining the moderation effect of CEO ten-
ure on the relationship between governance structure (independent variable) and enter-
prise performance in small and medium scale enterprises. The results of coefficients table 
for CEO tenure moderation are provided in the table below. 
According to the moderation analysis, CEO tenure significantly influenced perfor-
mance, as β = 0.62, t (141) = 3.74, p= 0.0003. However, governance structure failed to 
significantly contribute to enterprise performance, as β = 0.019, t (141) = 0.42, p = 0.68. 
Nonetheless, when the interaction term was added to the model, it significantly contrib-
uted to the overall enterprise performance model, as shows the significant interaction β = 
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-0.13, t (141) = -2.23, p= 0.03. The findings revealed that CEO tenure is a significant nega-
tive moderator of the relationship between governance structure and enterprise perfor-
mance. The overall model also proved significant F (3, 141) = 5.3887, p = 0.0015, R2= 0.103. 
Therefore, we reject the hypothesis H4 that “CEO tenure will have a significant positive 
moderation influence on the relationship between the governance structure and enter-
prise performance” and accept the null hypothesis. 
Table 3. The regression of CEO tenure moderation effects on governance structure-enterprise 
performance link 
Variables B se t p 
constant 13.7103 0.1530 89.5963 0.0000 
CEO Tenure 0.6157 0.1647 3.7393 0.0003 
Governance Structure 0.0191 0.0460 0.4155 0.6784 
Interaction -0.1282 0.0576 -2.2268 0.0275 
Interactions: governance structure and CEO tenure. 
B – unstandardised beta, se – standard error, t – t-test value, p – significance value. 
Source: own elaboration of research results (n=145). 
 
 
Figure 1. Slopes for governance structure predicting enterprise performance 
at each level of CEO tenure 
Source: own elaboration based on the 2019 study (n=145). 
Figure 1 shows that CEO tenure is a significant negative moderator of the relationship 
between governance structure and enterprise performance. The horizontal (x) axis repre-
sents three (3) levels of governance structure, whereas the vertical (y) axis – labelled en-
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the low, average, or high levels of the moderator (CEO tenure) is introduced into the rela-
tionship between governance structure and enterprise performance. From Figure 1, we 
read that the simple slope C for enterprise performance at one standard deviation (1 
SD) below the mean was 12.64, the unstandardised simple slope B for enterprise perfor-
mance at the mean level was 13.64, and the unstandardised simple slope A for enterprise 
performance at 1 SD above the mean of CEO tenure was 14.65. This slope A is what depicts 
a significant negative moderation effect by CEO tenure.  
Therefore, at low CEO tenure – when the CEO holds the position for a few years – gov-
ernance structure can predict increasing enterprise performance depicted by the dashed 
simple slope C. At average CEO tenure – when the CEO stays at post for a reasonable period 
of time – governance structure predicts insignificant change in levels of enterprise perfor-
mance depicted by the dotted simple slope B. At high CEO tenure – when the CEO stays at 
post for an extended period of time – governance structure predicts decreasing enterprise 
performance, as depicted by the inverse downward movement of the solid simple slope A 
from left to right. We may deduce from the findings that CEO tenure seems either too short 
or too long so that its moderation effect on the governance structure-performance link is 
significantly negative. According to Limbach et al. (2015), very short or long CEO tenures are 
linked to performance inefficiencies. Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) explain that CEOs may 
either take strategic decisions that are short term, medium-term, or long term. 
Granting long tenures to CEOs may assure CEOs job security and influence their in-
vestment decisions, because they would be around to observe the progress and fruits of 
their decisions. Therefore, the CEOs are likely to be proactive and magnanimous in their 
decisions because of such a psychological influence (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). Thus, the 
CEO’s tenure is a significant moderator. On the other hand, the longer a CEO runs an SME, 
the more likely they are to become lax and seek to amass more power and control, hence 
leading to empire-building to the detriment of the business’ welfare. This confirms the 
leader life cycle theory proposed by Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991), which asserts that 
performance slumps as CEOs’ interest in tasks gradually decreases, usually after six years 
on the job (Giambatista, 2004). Therefore, there is a need to discover what tenure is too 
long or too short in the Ghanaian SME context.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This study showed that individual components of governance structures did not influence 
the performance of SMEs. According to Lam and Lee (2008), CEO duality usually results in 
CEO dominance, leading to the ineffective monitoring of management, thus defeating the 
board’s purpose. The audit committee was also not found to significantly influence enter-
prise performance, although the audit committee functions as an additional control mech-
anism that ensures that shareholders’ interests are secured (Ahmed & Gabor, 2012). The 
frequency of audit committee’s meetings allows it to perform their functions effectively, 
as they can do concurrent monitoring to safeguard the interest of shareholders. The lead-
ership structure of boards does not directly influence the performance of the enterprise 
in any way. However, CEO tenure proved to have a significant negative moderating effect 
on the governance structure-enterprise performance link. 
The current study is not without limitations. First is the limited number of governance 
structure components considered for the study. More components could have been added 
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to the model, which could then have yielded a different result and expanded the discourse 
of the study. Furthermore, instead of employing the simple random sampling technique – 
which is more unbiased – the purposive-snowball sampling technique was used instead. 
Thus, structural equation modelling (SEM) was not used, which deprived the analysis of 
rigor. Future studies must focus on how SMEs in Ghana can put CEOs and board succession 
plans in place so as to ensure sustainable creativity and innovation in enterprises. 
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Governance structure variables – the presence of an audit committee, board size ade-
quacy, and board leadership – were computed as the mean of aggregate responses to 
question items relating to each governance structure component. Governance structure 
was also operationalised as the mean scores index of computed governance structure 
components. Enterprise performance was computed as the mean of the aggregate of re-
sponses to the four question items on the enterprise performance survey. Therefore, en-
terprise performance in this study is defined as the composite index of perceptions of 
profitability, sales, market share, and productivity. 
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